

DOES STOP AND SEARCH DETER CRIME? EVIDENCE FROM TEN YEARS OF LONDON-WIDE DATA

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In this article, we used ten years of police, crime and other data from London to investigate the potential effect of stop and search on crime. Using lagged regression models and a natural experiment, we show that the effect of stop and search is likely to be marginal, at best. While there is some association between stop and search and crime (particularly drug crime), claims that this is an effective way to control and deter offending seem misplaced. We close the discussion by suggesting that, first, in a legal sense the key issue is that each and every stop should be justified in itself, not in that it has some putative wider effect on crime, and, second, in a sociological sense, our findings support the idea that stop and search is a tool of social control widely defined, not crime-fighting, narrowly defined.

Key Words: stop and search, policing, deterrence

Introduction

Use of police powers to stop and search (S&S) members of the public has fallen significantly in England and Wales over the last few years. The number of recorded searches in 2014/15 was approximately 541,000 down by 58 per cent from a peak of almost 1 million in 2008/9 ([Home Office 2015](#)). Yet use of the power remains a controversial issue. The decline in recorded searches has not been accompanied by a similar reduction in the ethnic disproportionality in their application; in 2014/15, people who were identified as Black or Black British were still four times more likely to be searched than their white counterparts ([Home Office 2015](#)). S&S can still trigger significant reactions from individuals and groups who experience or observe its use, and wider social and political debates, as current disproportionalities entrench and interact with previous evidence of bias and discrimination.

Our focus in this article is not on ethnic disproportionality in S&S, which has been well documented elsewhere ([Bowling and Phillips 2007](#); [Equality and Human Rights Commission 2010](#); [Quinton 2015](#); [Bradford and Loader 2016](#)). Nor are we concerned with the wider social and cultural ‘meaning’ of stop and search—as a tool of social control ([Choongh 1997](#); [Bradford and Loader 2016](#)), for example—although we return to this question in the conclusion. Rather, we are concerned with whether S&S deters crime. This is a salient issue for two reasons. First, despite reductions in its use, S&S remains one of the most widely used formal police powers. Yet little is known about its effect on crime ([Delsol 2015](#)), particularly in a UK context. Second, it remains a commonplace of media and police accounts of S&S—particularly in relation to its recent

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reduction in use—that S&S ‘must’ affect crime. While the law governing S&S tends to revolve around the *investigation* of crime, there is no doubt that police officers and many observers of police activity take a broader view, believing that S&S has a *deterrent* effect. This makes consideration of its likely effect on crime a pressing policy concern.

To address this, we use ten years’ worth of S&S, crime and other data from London, aggregated at the borough level, and we take two distinct analytical approaches. First, we utilize fixed-effect regression models estimating the lagged effect of S&S on crime. Second, interrupted time-series analysis is used to explore the potential effect of the sudden rise in the use of ‘suspicion-less’ or authorized searches that occurred from 2007 to 2011. We find that S&S has only a very weak and inconsistent association with crime. While there is some correlation, most notably in relation to drug offences, we conclude that the deterrent effect of S&S is likely to be small, at best.


Setting the Scene

The ‘power’ of S&S in England and Wales comprises a range of powers governed by several pieces of legislation that enable officers to search for a range of items. Most well known is section 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (hereafter s1), which enables searches for stolen goods and a range of prohibited items (such as offensive weapons). Additional powers include those granted under section 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 (s23) for controlled substances; section 47 of Firearms Act 1968 (s47) for firearms; section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994 (s60) to prevent acts of serious violence; and section 44 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (s44, since repealed) to prevent acts of terror. For the purposes of this article, we distinguish between two broad groups of powers—those that require officers to have ‘reasonable suspicion’ before conducting a search (s1, s23 and s47) and those that do not but, instead, require them to be authorized to carry out searches in a defined area for specified time period (s60 and s44).

Although S&S has come to be one of the most emblematic, indeed arguably foundational powers, of the police in England and Wales, the extent of its uses varies markedly across time and place (Bradford 2017). The data used in this article cover London during the period 2004–14. By way of an introduction, Figure 1 shows that while recorded crime declined gradually but consistently over this period, S&S showed marked variations month-on-month and over the ten-year study period. The recorded use of reasonable suspicion searches increased between 2004 and 2010 and then went into steady decline. Authorized searches that do not require officers to have reasonable grounds were rarely used before the middle of 2007; after that point their use markedly increased, reaching a peak in 2008, before going into steady decline. After a further peak in August 2011 (which coincided with the London riots), usage again became rare.

The Deterrent Effect of S&S

We are concerned in this article with the deterrent effect of S&S on potential offenders; specifically, whether a marginal change in the S&S rate in an area can be linked to a subsequent change in the crime rate in the same area. It is worth reiterating that this is not the legal justification for most searches. While the authorized search powers



Note: Susceptible crime = those crimes that are susceptible to detection by S&S.

FIG. 1 Trends in searches and crime (Metropolitan Police, 2004–14). Susceptible crime = those crimes that are susceptible to detection by S&S

are framed in legislation explicitly in terms of prevention, more commonly used reasonable suspicion powers are framed as investigatory tools.¹ However, considering the mechanisms by which S&S might reduce crime, and given the significant conceptual overlap between apprehension and deterrence as well as the nature of public and policy debate around S&S (very often framed in terms of deterrence), we believe that this is a justifiable starting point for our analysis.

Deterrence theory distinguishes between different ‘varieties’ of deterrence. In the case of S&S, the most pertinent relate, first, to the *certainty* of apprehension as a lever for deterring potential offenders. It is usually argued that what deters people from committing a crime is not the severity of any punishment that may ensue, nor the speed with which it will be delivered, but their perception of how likely they are to be caught (Apel and Nagin 2011; Nagin 2013; see also Pratt *et al.* 2009). If it is to have a deterrent effect, S&S, must make acts of crime appear riskier to potential offenders by suggesting that they are likely to be caught if they do break the law.

Second, deterrence theory rests on the contrast between *specific* and *general* deterrence: to whom is the risk of apprehension communicated? Specific deterrence functions at the individual level, referring here to the effect of S&S *experiences* on offenders—and others—who have been interdicted by police. A proportion of those searched will be arrested or handed an alternative sanction such as a cannabis warning or fixed penalty notice. Having been caught ‘red-handed’, it naturally seems possible that these individuals might be deterred from committing a crime in the future. Likewise, simply being stopped and searched, even when one has not broken any law, may have a future deterrent effect on one’s behaviour. General deterrence, by contrast, refers to the effect S&S *awareness* might have on the behaviour of the general population who see or hear about this type of police activity or who merely know the police can carry out S&S. Witnessing or having some knowledge about S&S may shift people’s risk perceptions, leading them to believe, for example, that police are effective ‘sentinels’ (Nagin *et al.* 2015) who are capable of apprehending offenders.

Deterrence theory is thus premised on the existence of rational potential offenders who undertake ‘a conscious weighing of the benefits and costs of offending contingent

¹PACE Code of Practice A states that the purpose of S&S is ‘to enable officers to allay or confirm suspicions about individuals without exercising their power of arrest’ (Home Office and College of Policing 2014: para 1.4).

on and constrained by factors of the environment [and] situation' (Nagin *et al.* 2015: 79). S&S activity comprises part of the environments and situations within which potential offenders make decisions, and it exerts an influence on their behaviour by making offending riskier. This argument involves two core assumptions: that people are aware of the level of police activity in their environment and that they update their risk perceptions as a result of experiencing or knowing about such activity, such that an increase in objective risk of sanction (more policing) is linked to an increase in subjective risk. If these assumptions do not hold it is hard to envisage how S&S can have a deterrent effect on crime.

While there is debate within the literature (Apel 2013; Pickett and Roche 2016), the balance of evidence suggests it is unlikely that 'criminal justice policies or police activities exert...influence on individual's perceptions of arrest risk' (Pickett and Roche 2016: 729) in any widespread or consistent manner (see also Paternoster 2010). There is little reason to believe that there *is* an awareness of the general volume, distribution or nature of police activity such as S&S, casting doubt on the idea that S&S has a *general* deterrent effect on crime. To put it another way 'it is not clear how or even if individuals update their subjective probabilities [of sanction risk] in response to changes in objective sanction risk' (Apel 2013: 86). If police change the objective risk of sanction by increasing the level of S&S in an area, this will not necessarily lead to changes in the behaviour of people in that area, since they do not 'notice' police activity in such a way that would lead them to reassess how risky they thought certain behaviours were.

There *is* however evidence on *specific* deterrence that suggests people update their risk perceptions as a result of personal and perhaps vicarious experience of arrest or apprehension (Apel 2013). Notably, it seems that the extent of such updating (the size of the shift in perceived risk) is greatest among those who commit crime, do not get caught, and consequently lower their risk perceptions, thus making them more likely to offend in the future (Pogarsky *et al.* 2005; Matsueda *et al.* 2006). It is therefore possible that a decline in S&S rates, in as much as it results in a reduction in the number of people apprehended after offending,² may have an upward effect on crime rates because it diminishes the perceived risk of sanction among those who 'get away' with crimes (i.e. who could have been searched while intending to or having committed an offence but were not). By contrast, it is somewhat less clear that individuals who *are* searched and/or sanctioned by police update their risk perceptions accordingly (i.e. are led to believe they are likely to be searched and/or sanctioned again in the future). Piliavin *et al.* (1986), for example, found that there was no correlation between their respondents' prior arrest records and a measure of the perceived risk of formal sanction (see also Kleck *et al.* 2005). There may thus be an asymmetry in the potential effect of S&S on people disposed to offend. Other studies, however, report broadly 'symmetrical' effects of prior arrests on updating (e.g. Lochner 2007; Anwar and Loughran 2011), suggesting that people who are arrested do update their risk perceptions accordingly.

It is also possible that S&S has a 'disruptive' effect that does not fit neatly into deterrence theory, but rather, situational crime prevention. First, use of the power(s) in an area may make it harder for offenders to offend—for example by motivating the

²Recall that a non-trivial proportion of all arrests result from an S&S. For example, in 2014/15, there were 950,000 arrests for notifiable offences in England and Wales; over the same period, 75,000 arrests resulted from searches conducted under s1 PACE and associated legislation (Home Office 2015).

‘stashing’ rather than carrying of knives—and thus disrupt their activity by delaying, displacing or reducing its severity. Second, an officer may search someone for ‘going equipped’: they had not yet stolen something, but were actively planning to do so. Ignoring for the moment that a search has created a possession offence, the officer has prevented future crime. Such situations are better described as disruption rather than deterrence because the motivation of the offender is unaffected, but, situationally, they cannot commit their planned crime.

A further complicating factor is that not all crimes are equally ‘susceptible’ to S&S (Miller *et al.* 2000). At a general level, crimes in the categories of violence, robbery, burglary, theft and handling, drugs and some forms of criminal damage are generally considered susceptible, as they involve the carrying of items related to the offence (e.g. a weapon, stolen property, drugs). Other important categories, such as fraud, harassment/stalking and cybercrime, are by nature not susceptible to this form of police intervention. One implication here is that if attention is limited to the relationship between S&S and ‘all-crime’, then analysis may under-estimate its effect, and that consideration of specific crime types is required.

There is an important counterpoint to the discussion thus far. In contrast to the deterrence literature, there is significant evidence that targeted police strategies, most notably hotspots policing, *can* have an effect on crime (Weisburd and Eck 2004; Braga *et al.* 2014). This is relevant in the current context because such strategies often contain increased use of S&S, either intentionally or simply as a result of deploying additional police officers (see for example Taylor *et al.* 2011). While the causal mechanisms behind the observed effects of hotspot policing on crime remain opaque, it seems that targeted S&S activity *may* reduce crime, presumably via some sort of specific deterrent effect. However, such strategies were not in common use in the Metropolitan Police during the period covered in this article. While small independent efforts may have been implemented at some times and places, we have no reason to believe that S&S activity was actively being targeted towards crime hotspots in a systematic and consistent manner across the police force area. Indeed, evidence suggests that it is people, not places, that are most commonly ‘targeted’ by officers for S&S (Quinton 2011; Bradford and Loader 2016) and that officers’ perceptions of high-crime locations may not be accurate (Ratcliffe and McCullagh 2001; Chainey and Macdonald 2012). It seems unlikely then that S&S, certainly when measured at a borough level, might have exerted an effect on crime via a focus on high-crime locations.

Findings From Existing Studies

Given the discussion above, it is perhaps not surprising that existing studies of the effect of S&S (and related activities) on crime report very mixed findings. The foundational—and much critiqued—study in the field is *Boydston (1975)*. A quasi-experiment conducted in the San Diego in the early 1970s found that the suspension of Field Interrogations (FIs) in one beat appeared to lead to an increase in ‘suppressible’ crime compared to a ‘business as usual’ control site and a beat where only specially trained officers were allowed to conduct FIs, but that there was no significant change in the total number of arrests across all three sites. Two more recent quasi-experimental studies are reported by *McCandless et al. (2016)* and *MacDonald et al. (2016)*. McCandless

et al. used a retrospective design to explore the effect of Operation BLUNT 2 in London (a knife crime initiative involving a large increase in s60 searches in some Metropolitan Police boroughs). Using difference in differences analysis, which compared change in the boroughs where Operation BLUNT 2 was in place with change in those where it was not, they concluded that the police operation (i.e. a large increase in weapons searches) had no effect on police recorded crime; indeed, ambulance calls fell faster in those boroughs where there were smaller increases in searches.

MacDonald *et al.* (2016) used a similar design, this time based around Operation Impact in New York, which involved increasing the number of officers, Stop, Question and Frisks (SQFs) and arrests in hotspots ('impact zones'). Different types of SQF appeared to have different effects. While an increase in those SQFs based on reasonable suspicion had no consistent association with crime, the increase in SQFs based on probable cause (a higher legal threshold linked to specific criminal behaviour) was associated with relative reductions in total reported crimes, assaults, burglaries, drug violations, misdemeanour crimes, felony property crimes, robberies and felony violent crimes in the impact zones. The authors, however, described the results as having 'little practical importance' (MacDonald *et al.* 2016: 9) because of the small size of the reductions and the fact that probable cause SQFs made up a tiny proportion of the overall increase in SQFs. Also, the reductions could not, in the main, be directly attributed to increases in 'investigative stops': MacDonald *et al.* note, echoing the wider literature on hotspots, that the precise cause of the observed effects from Operation Impact remained unclear.

Other studies have used time-series and associated techniques to examine observational data. J. Penzer's unpublished analysis of Metropolitan Police data looked at whether S&S across London had lagged monthly effects on total recorded crime and street robbery. No underlying associations were found once a sudden upward 'shock' in total crime was taken into account. Smith *et al.* (2012) used city- and precinct-level data from New York to explore lagged weekly effects of SQF on nine types of recorded crime, concluding that SQF was negatively associated with four (vehicle crime, robbery, assault and rape) but not with the others. Notably, effects, even when statistically significant, were very small. For example, Smith *et al.* estimated that if SQF was 10 per cent higher in week 1, robbery would have been 0.09 per cent lower than predicted at the precinct level, and 0.03 per cent lower than predicted at the city level, in week 2 (2012: 32). Rosenfeld and Fornango (2014) also used precinct data from New York, although this time aggregated at an annual level, and concluded that SQF had no significant effect on burglary or robbery once relevant confounds were taken into account. Fagan (2016), again looking at New York, explored whether probable cause SQFs and reasonable suspicion SQFs had different effects on six crime types at the precinct level. He found that aggregates of both SQF types had significant negative two-monthly lagged effects on violent felonies, property felonies, drug crimes, weapon offences, other felonies and misdemeanours but that the effects were consistently larger when probable cause SQFs were examined on their own. The analysis also suggested the sharpest decreases in crime were associated with the highest concentrations of probable cause SQFs. Fagan thus concluded that targeted use of searches based on reasonable suspicion was unproductive, compared to those based on a higher standard of evidence, and add 'nothing to the crime control efforts of law enforcement' (2016: 79).

Finally, Weisburd *et al.* (2015) used data aggregated at much lower levels temporally (days and weeks) and spatially (street segments) to again explore SQF in New York, in particular its potential contribution to a hotspots policing strategy. Looking at lagged weekly effects across the city, the authors found that SQF had a significant, albeit small, negative association with crime at the street segment level, although the size of the effect was variable across different boroughs (their analysis suggested that an extra 700,000 SQF would reduce crime by 2 per cent—2016: 47). They also looked at specific instances of SQF in the Bronx and found that these they were negatively associated with crime for up to five days afterwards. Weisburd *et al.*, therefore, concluded that SQF had a significant, if small, effect on crime when targeted intensively in high-crime locations (albeit this was an approach that had been ruled unconstitutional).

In sum, there is little agreement in the literature as to the existence, or likely size, of any effect of S&S on crime rates. Some studies report modest but significant effects, at least in relation to some crime types, while others report null findings. We cannot, in this article, provide a definitive answer to this apparent conundrum. Rather, we use London as a case study from which to add to this growing body of evidence.

Research Design

Aims and hypotheses

This article examines whether the use of S&S by the Metropolitan Police reduced crime via a deterrent effect on potential offenders. Using borough-level data covering a ten-year period, we tested the following hypotheses:

- H1 That overall S&S, under any power, was negatively associated with subsequent levels of total recorded crime.
- H2 That overall S&S, under any power, was negatively associated with subsequent levels of specific types of recorded crime.
- H3 That S&S under particular powers was negatively associated with subsequent levels of specific types of recorded crimes.
- H4 That sudden changes in the use of s60 searches were associated with changes in violent crime.

Data

The Metropolitan Police provided daily counts of recorded searches and particular categories of crime that might be susceptible to S&S for every borough in London from April 2004 to November 2014. While data on all 32 boroughs were provided, Westminster was excluded from the analysis presented here as it was an outlier in terms of its population size and number of recorded searches.³

Separate counts were provided for the various powers. Daily crime counts were also provided for recorded drugs offences, non-domestic violent crime, burglary, robbery and theft, vehicle crime and criminal damage, which we aggregated into an overall count of total susceptible crime. To enable us to explore the specific relationship

³All models were reproduced including Westminster, with little effect on the results.

between S&S and violence further, we obtained counts of weapon-enabled non-domestic violent crime from the Metropolitan Police and of ambulance incidents related to ‘stab/shot/weapon wounds’ from the London Ambulance Service. In theory, the former should have been the sub-category of violence most susceptible to S&S, while the latter should have overcome some of the problems of violence not being reported to the police and not being included in the counts of recorded crime.

The counts were converted into rates per 100,000 residents to control for population and to better reflect the likelihood of an individual being searched by the police or becoming a victim of crime.⁴ Table 1 presents summary of these data.

There were two limitations to these data. First, we examine broad categories of crime. While the use of more specific crime types might have provided a better test of S&S, too many boroughs recorded no offences under each category, especially on a weekly basis, which complicated the type of analysis presented here.⁵ It was also not possible, for example, to test whether S&S was associated with knife crime for this reason. Second, as the analysis relied mainly on police data, we could only analyse activities and crimes that were recorded by officers. For example, during this period, data were recorded about arrests from searches but not any other ‘positive outcome’ (e.g. fixed penalty notices).

It is also worth noting that we only look at the quantity of searches, not their ‘quality’ (e.g. the context in which they were performed or how they were conducted). It is highly likely that policing priorities and practices will have varied by borough and over time, and it is beyond the scope of this article to relate the results of our analysis to these variations. Our analysis therefore presents an average for the 31 boroughs over the ten-year study period and, as such, should be regarded as a ‘real world’ assessment of the effectiveness S&S rather than a test under ‘ideal conditions’.

Analysis

We tested H1, H2 and H3 using regression analysis (the fourth was tested via a quasi-experimental design—see below). The regression analysis was complicated by the problem of reverse causality. Searches and crime are associated in many different ways, making it extremely difficult to untangle cause and effect, and as Figure 2 shows, there are five relationships of interest:


- A. S&S levels and crime might influence one another in the same period (at either time 1 or time 2). For example, S&S might be carried out in response to higher crime, crime might be reduced by S&S, and/or crime might be increased by S&S if the searches led to new offences being discovered and recorded.
- B. S&S levels (time 2) might be influenced by S&S in the previous period (time 1).
- C. S&S levels (time 2) may respond to crime in the previous period (time 1).
- D. Crime levels (time 2) might be influenced by crime in the previous period (time 1).
- E. Crime levels (time 2) might be reduced by S&S in the previous period (time 1).

⁴The rates were based on mid-year population estimates for each borough from the ONS and splined to produce monthly and weekly estimates.

⁵Attempts to use negative binomial models were complicated by the number of variables and, indeed, we could not make those models converge.

TABLE 1 *Descriptive statistics (per borough, per week)*

Variable	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum	
S&S	Total searches (all powers)	229	169	6	2,574
	s1 (weapons) and s47	32	31	0	323
	s1 (not weapons)	68	48	1	530
	s23	120	96	2	938
	s60	20	73	0	1,720
Crime	Total susceptible crime	409	140	104	1,034
	Non-domestic violent crime	75	29	10	215
	Drug offences	32	23	0	332
	Burglary	55	20	6	244
	Robbery and theft	134	64	21	615
	Vehicle crime	67	28	5	220
	Criminal damage	44	21	3	170



Note: It is possible that searches and crime respond to one another at different speeds. For example, offenders may respond quicker to more S&S than the police do to more crime.

FIG. 2 The potential relationships between searches and crime. It is possible that searches and crime respond to one another at different speeds. For example, offenders may respond quicker to more S&S than the police do to more crime

The challenge is, therefore, to show whether S&S had a lagged relationship with crime (E) above and beyond all other possible associations. In order to do this, we included the lagged crime rate and the current rate of S&S in all our models (essentially an autoregressive distributed lag (1,1) model). This controls for relationships A–D, but it also creates some statistical challenges that will be considered below.

The other important aspect of research design is the level of aggregation. Studies have examined the impact of searches annually (Rosenfeld and Fornango 2014) and daily (Weisburd *et al.* 2015). We chose months and weeks as a middle ground, which is justified on theoretical and methodological grounds. Theoretically, it seems somewhat implausible that people will adjust their beliefs about the likelihood of being searched on a daily basis. But equally, it is hard to imagine any deterrent mechanism working on a very long time scale, as people's beliefs are likely to update more often than annually. Methodologically, it is significant that our data were collected at the borough level. Weisburd *et al.*'s (2015) study used daily data but on a micro-geographic scale, where

it is plausible that a daily surge in S&S could impact crime. With geographical units as big as ours, it would be almost impossible to cut through the noise in daily fluctuations. However, at the other extreme, modelling a yearly effect would require a very different statistical approach and many more control variables that were available to us. We therefore investigated the medium-term dynamics of the relationship between searches and crime: looking at the effect over weeks and months.

We developed a series of fixed effects regression models to test our first three hypotheses:

- H1 Weekly and monthly models testing whether total susceptible crime was associated with total S&S under any power, on the basis that offenders may not have distinguished between different search powers.
- H2 A series of weekly and monthly models exploring whether our six categories of crime were related to total S&S, for the same reason.
- H3 A series of weekly and monthly models exploring whether the following crime types were affected by particular search powers, to which they were most likely to be susceptible to detection: drugs offence and s23 searches; non-domestic violent crime and s1 searches and s47 searches; burglary and s1 searches; robbery and theft and s1 (non-weapon) searches; vehicle crime and s1 (non-weapon) searches; and criminal damage and s1 (non-weapon) searches.

To enable this analysis, we converted the crime and S&S rates to natural logs to reduce skewness and to allow us to interpret coefficients as a percentage change in crime rate given a 1 per cent change in S&S rate (for clarity results table show the effects of a 10 per cent change in S&S rate). These were then aggregated by week in the first data set (31 boroughs \times 554 weeks = 17,174 observations) and by month in the second (31 boroughs \times 127 months = 3,937 observations).

We also controlled for several other factors. First, the level of overall police activity using counts of full-time equivalent police officers in each borough.⁶ We preferred this proxy measure of police activity to a count of total arrests in each borough because, in the arrest data, 'borough' represents the custody suite that the arrestee was taken to, not the place of arrest. The allocation of arrestees to custody suites is organized centrally and depends on multiple factors such as cell availability, special operations and suites dedicated to certain offences. When custody suites are closed for repairs, boroughs register zero arrests (this happened in six boroughs during our data period, which would have been dropped from the analysis).

Second, our analysis took account of any unobserved characteristics of each borough (fixed effects). Third, all models included time-period fixed effects. This allowed us to control for seasonality, changes in Home Office counting rules or any other London-wide shocks to the crime rate. Fourth, we took account of long-term changes in crime rate within each borough by including borough-specific linear time trends. Finally, as we were mainly interested in testing the deterrent effect of S&S and because arrests resulting from searches could have been independently associated with crime,⁷ we also

⁶These data were provided by the Metropolitan Police with yearly totals that were linearly interpolated to monthly and weekly figures.

⁷For example, crime levels might have been influenced by search-arrests in the same period (if they resulted in new crimes being discovered and recorded) and by previous search-arrests (if they resulted in offenders being incapacitated).

controlled for the number of search-arrests at both time 1 and time 2 and $t - 1$.⁸ See Technical Appendix for full model specification and estimation strategy.

Quasi-experimental Design

We explored our fourth hypothesis with a different approach. The sudden increase and decrease in use of s60 searches in the Metropolitan Police during our data period allowed us to conduct a quasi-experiment comparing the periods before and after s60 searches became common place.⁹ We did not expect the increased use of s60 powers to have an instant impact and so it did not make sense to think of this as a one-off ‘treatment’. Instead, we examined whether the trend in non-domestic violent crime during the period when s60 powers were being used was significantly different to the trend in the preceding period. To be clear: if s60 powers were effective in reducing violence, then we would have expected the rate of decline in non-domestic violent crime to have increased in this period. We, therefore, performed an interrupted time-series analysis using Prais–Winsten regression to test this hypothesis.¹⁰ We did not need to control for seasonality as both periods extended over multiple years. Furthermore, as s60 powers were not used each month in every borough, we had to aggregate the different panels together, looking at the effect across London as a whole.

Results

Regression analysis

Table 2 presents a summary of the results across different crime types for both the monthly and weekly datasets (full tables of results are available from the lead author). We start by looking at the effect of S&S under all powers on total susceptible crime (H1). The results show that a 10 per cent increase in S&S was associated with a drop in susceptible crime of 0.32 per cent (monthly) or 0.14 per cent (weekly). Although statistically significant, this effect was extremely small. In addition, most of the effect that searches had on total crime seemed to come from the specific impact of searches on drug offences. When we excluded drug offences from the total crime rate and s23 searches from the S&S rate, the size of the effects halved in both the weekly and monthly models.

Table 2 also shows the results of our tests of H2 and H3 for each crime type. The clearest results were for drug offences: a 10 per cent increase in rates of total S&S per month decreased recorded drug offences by 1.85 per cent. Again, this was stronger than the weekly effect of 0.64 per cent. We also estimated the net effect of s23 searches, controlling for all other searches at time 1 and time 2. This suggested that most of the

⁸We also experimented with controlling for unemployment but did not find any statistically significant effects and, as it did not affect our results, we have not included it in the models presented here.

⁹We chose not to extend this analysis into the third period after 2011 (when s60 use subsided) because it would have been almost impossible to decide on a theoretically appropriate end-point for this period. As Figure 3 shows, after the end of 2011, non-domestic violent crime continued to decline and, although it increased from the middle of 2013, it seems unlikely that this was an 18-month lagged effect of reduced s60 usage.

¹⁰The Durbin–Watson statistics revealed positive serial correlation.

TABLE 2 *Summary results*

Crime	Power	Lagged effect on crime rate, if S&S was 10% higher			
		Weekly	<i>p</i>	Monthly	<i>p</i>
Total susceptible crime	Total searches (all powers)	-0.14%	0.01	-0.32%	0.01
Drugs offences	Total searches (all powers)	-0.64%	0.01	-1.85%	0.00
	s23 searches ^a	-0.21%	0.37	-1.57%	0.00
Non-domestic violent crime	Total searches (all powers)	+0.09%	0.33	-0.14%	0.21
	s1 and s47 (weapon) searches ^a	-0.01%	0.00	-0.00%	0.17
Burglary	Total searches (all powers)	-0.17%	0.04	-0.21%	0.12
	s1 (non-weapons) searches ^a	-0.10%	0.10	-0.47%	0.00
Robbery and theft	Total searches (all powers)	-0.03%	0.54	-0.13%	0.35
	s1 (non-weapons) searches ^a	-0.08%	0.18	-0.04%	0.64
Vehicle crime	Total searches (all powers)	-0.08%	0.21	-0.04%	0.73
	s1 (non-weapons) searches ^a	-0.03%	0.96	-0.07%	0.58
Criminal damage	Total searches (all powers)	-0.01%	0.88	-0.06%	0.67
	s1 (non-weapons) searches ^a	-0.05%	0.40	-0.06%	0.66

All models estimated using fixed-effect estimator (OLS) with cluster-robust standard errors. Variables not shown: lagged dependent variable, number of full-time equivalent police officers, period fixed effects, borough-specific linear time trends, current rate of S&S, search-arrests in current period (time 2) and search-arrests in previous period (time 1).

^aNet of all other searches.

effect at the monthly level came from s23 searches, although note we did not find corroborating evidence at the weekly level.

We struggled to find evidence of an effect of S&S on violent crime. The only statistically significant result was the net effect of s1 and s47 weapon searches at the weekly level, and the effect here was far smaller than the any of our other findings: a 10 per cent increase in S&S led to 0.01 per cent decrease in non-domestic violent crime. As a test of robustness, we also looked at weapon-enabled non-domestic violence and found similar nil results: no effect for all searches and a tiny, but statistically significant, effect for s1 and s47 searches. Moreover, when we used ambulance incident data for calls related to 'stab/shot/weapon wounds', we found no statistically significant results at all. Note that, to ensure comparability, we used the same type of linear model for these two alternative measures but, because of the large number of zeros for both (especially in the weekly data), these figures need to be treated with some caution.

The results for burglary were similarly inconsistent. At the weekly level, a 10 per cent increase in total searches seemed to reduce burglary by about 0.17 per cent. However, the effect was non-significant at the monthly level. By contrast, the net effect of s1 searches was only significant at the monthly level (there the effect of a 10 per cent rise in S&S would be a 0.47 per cent decrease). These effects were again very small and inconsistently significant and so must be treated with caution. There was also no evidence of an effect on robbery and theft (separately and together), vehicle crime or criminal damage.

One potential problem with our analysis is that of multiple comparisons. As we tested for so many associations, there was a chance that some of the statistically significant

results reported above would have come about purely by chance. See the Technical Appendix for details on how we addressed this issue, which reinforces the sense that the effect of S&S on crime is marginal at best.

Quasi-experimental results

Recall that the sudden increase and decrease in s60 searches allows us to conduct a quasi-experiment comparing the periods before and after s60 searches became common place. As Table 3 and Figure 3 show, there was no statistically significant change in the trend in non-domestic violent crime between the period when s60 searches were used extensively and the period before. This result was robust to the inclusion of population data and officer numbers and to reasonable changes in the timing of the ‘interruption’. In fact, the rate of decline of non-domestic violent crime seemed, if anything, to have slowed (i.e. the coefficient for change to trend was positive and became significant once controls for population are added).

Discussion and Conclusions

Overall, the analysis presented above suggests that, although S&S had a weak association with some forms of crime across London between 2004 and 2014, the effect was at the outer margins of statistical and social significance (H1). We found no evidence for effects on robbery and theft, vehicle crime or criminal damage, and inconsistent evidence of very small effects on burglary, non-domestic violent crime and total crime; the only strong evidence was for effects on drug offences (H2 and H3). When we looked separately at s60 searches, it did not appear that a sudden surge in usage had any effect on the underlying trend in non-domestic violent crime (H4). In other words, we found very little evidence to support any of our hypotheses.

The relationship between S&S and drugs, however, stands out in terms of its relative strength and consistency. This might be thought to provide compelling evidence of S&S having had a deterrent effect on this form of offending. However, there are several other plausible causal mechanisms that might explain the relationship we observe. A deterrent-based explanation assumes that drug users and dealers stop offending when perceived risk reaches a certain level. However, another possibility is that higher rates of S&S prompt people to change their behaviour to make it harder for officers to uncover drugs (e.g. being more cautious, by carrying smaller amounts and hiding them more carefully) or that people carrying drugs—especially hard drug users—are simply

TABLE 3 *The impact of changes in s60 on violent crime*

	Coefficient	Standard error	$p > t$
Original trend	-2.28	0.46	0.00
Shock	159.39	80.4	0.05
Change to trend	0.63	0.77	0.42
Constant	3983.52	66.94	0.00

Estimated using Prais–Winsten regression with errors assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive process.




FIG. 3 Interrupted time-series analysis of the effect of s60 searches on non-domestic violent crime

displaced to nearby areas that are less ‘hot’ in terms of police activity (Wood *et al.* 2004; Small *et al.* 2006). Furthermore, police recorded crime data are unlikely to be the most reliable measure of drug crime. The number of recorded drug offences will depend largely on police activity that discovers people in possession of drugs and not on the underlying prevalence of drug use. This is not to say that S&S has no deterrent effect on drug crime, but clearly, more research is needed to fully understand the mechanisms behind the association described above.

It was also notable that the month-on-month relationship between S&S and crime was consistently stronger than the week-on-week relationship. One possible explanation is that people need to be exposed to higher levels of S&S for a longer period of time (particularly at the borough level) before they update their beliefs about the likelihood of being apprehended. As noted above, Weisburd *et al.* (2015) have suggested that SQF has a deterrent effect over a matter of days, but their study was focused at a very local level where it might be more reasonable to expect that people notice, and respond to, daily fluctuations in police activity.

Our results would seem to support, therefore, the idea that police activity—at least in the form of S&S—has relatively little deterrent effect. Indeed, assuming that longer-term incapacitation effects from S&S are minimal, it also appears that this form of policing has little effect on crime via other routes (e.g. disruption). Taken together, therefore, our results suggest that we should stop thinking about S&S as a *tactic*, which can be deliberately increased with a view to reducing crime, and focus instead on the appropriateness and legal justification of individual uses of the powers.

This last point goes to the crux of the matter. The downward trend in S&S that started in the second half of our study period has since continued; reasonable suspicion searches fell by 46 per cent between 2013/14 and 2015/16, a reduction that was echoed nationally (Hargreaves *et al.* 2016). While there are many explanations for this drop, it is plausible that increased scrutiny had some effect on police practices. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (2013) and the Home Secretary (2014) both criticized the

misuse of S&S and their assessments led to the introduction of the voluntary Best Use of S&S Scheme and national training (Quinton and Packham 2016). These concerns were echoed by the incoming Commissioner of the Met, Sir Bernard Hogan-Howe. The tone of this narrative, however, started to shift in response to increased knife crime in London from around 2015. On his retirement, Hogan-Howe questioned whether there might be a ‘floor’ in the reductions of S&S, after which it ceased to be effective in reducing crime: ‘...it’s possible we got too low in stop/search—a 70% [reduction] is a very big change’ (2017). More recently, his replacement Cressida Dick has, along with the Home Secretary, sought to encourage officers to have greater confidence in their powers, while emphasizing the need for them to act lawfully (Dick 2017).

Our analysis concurs with most other studies in the field in concluding that increasing levels of S&S is likely to have *at best* a very marginal effect on emerging crime problems. This is not to claim, however, that individual searches do not produce useful ‘results’ (e.g. uncovering contraband and/or preventing a potential crime). It seems to us that the debates that swirl around S&S could usefully be refocused on the instances when the power is used, rather than on its alleged effect on crime in a general sense. As per most of the legislation governing S&S, the police should ask not whether S&S—as a tactic—contributes to crime reduction, but whether each and every search—as a power—is legally and operationally justified.

This is not to say that overall volume is unimportant, and the relationship between drugs and searches is again interesting here. The overall level of S&S is, to a large extent, determined by the number of searches for drugs—they represented over 60 per cent of all searches in 2015/16 (Hargreaves *et al.* 2016)—which provides something of a conundrum in the light of the results described above. On the one hand, drugs offences seem to be the crime type most affected by the volume of S&S. On the other hand, most drug searches are for cannabis possession (Quinton *et al.* 2017), the reduction of which is unlikely to be a priority for any police force (and which comes with a range of well-known net-widening effects—Release 2013). While it is beyond the scope of the current article to consider this question in any depth, the effectiveness of the power needs to be considered in light of the ‘usefulness’ of its ends. Even if S&S is effective in deterring minor drug offending, is this reason enough for its continued use at current or indeed raised levels?

Finally, there is a deeper question that bears some reflection. We have little reason to believe that the results we have presented differ from what would have been found at other times and places in England, Wales and across the UK. It seems likely that S&S has never been particularly effective in controlling crime. Why, then, is the power still so commonly used? On one level, the answer is simple: police officers believe that S&S is a useful tool of crime control. Yet it is equally important to recognize that S&S is not solely about crime. As research over three decades has suggested, it is also a tool of order maintenance, used by police officers seeking to assert power and control in a situation or locale (Smith and Gray 1985; Choongh 1997; Quinton 2011). S&S may also play a structural role linked to the basic function of police as an institution of social ordering: a way for police to discipline and ascribe identity to the populations they police (Bradford and Loader 2016). The extent and distribution of its use may be affected by the location of the *policed* within social, economic and other hierarchies (c.f. Waddington *et al.* 2004). The benign interpretation of this wider function of S&S is that it can be a useful way for police to establish authority and maintain order. A less

benign interpretation is, of course, that this is a power directed disproportionately towards people from marginal and excluded social groups, and which serves only to deepen their marginality (McAra and McVie 2005; Bradford 2017). On both accounts, the question as to whether S&S has crime control properties is rather beside the point, as this is in some fundamental sense not what the power is ‘about’.

Our findings offer support to these arguments, at least in as much as they add to the weight of evidence that S&S is, at least in the aggregate, not about crime. If it were, we would expect a much stronger association between levels of S&S and crime than that which we identify in our models. However, police, politicians and public hold on to the idea that this is a useful way for police to ‘fight crime’. Indeed, S&S may be seen as effective *because* it is done by police, and police action, as opposed to inaction, is by definition effective in controlling crime. S&S is, if nothing else, a visible way of ‘doing something about crime’. Research that considers the ‘effectiveness’ of S&S, such as the present study, can therefore only address one part of a much bigger picture. But, it is an important part, not least because it might help to dispel some of these myths and refocus attention where it should properly be: on the fact that S&S should concern only the investigation of specific crimes and on the need to limit its use to appropriate situations to avoid damage to public trust and police legitimacy.

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Technical Appendix

Our final regression model is described by the following equation:

$$Y_{i,t} = \beta_1 X_{i,t} + \beta_2 X_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 Y_{i,t-1} + \beta_4 A_{i,t} + \beta_5 A_{i,t-1} + \beta_6 P_{i,t} + \beta_7 \mathbf{D}_i + \beta_8 \mathbf{L}_{i,t} + \beta_9 \mathbf{T}_t + e_{it}$$

where i = borough, t = month/week, $Y_{i,t}$ is the current crime rate, $X_{i,t}$ is the current rate of S&S, $X_{i,t-1}$ is the rate of S&S in the previous period, $Y_{i,t-1}$ is the crime rate in the previous period, $A_{i,t}$ is the number of search-arrests in the current period, $A_{i,t-1}$ is the number of search-arrests in the previous period, $P_{i,t}$ is estimated police numbers, \mathbf{D}_i is a $1 \times N$ vector of dummy variable for each borough, $\mathbf{L}_{i,t}$ is a $1 \times N$ vector of borough-specific linear time trends, \mathbf{T}_t is a $1 \times T$ vector of dummy variables for each month/week and e_{it} is the error term. (The models looking at specific search powers also included the rate of all other search powers at both time periods so that we can look at the effect of e.g. s23 searches net of all other searches.)

Estimation strategies

Including a lagged dependent variable in our fixed-effect models could create estimation problems because it renders OLS inconsistent. [Stephen Nickell \(1981\)](#) demonstrated this inconsistency for fixed t , but showed that the bias disappears as t increases. Given the large number of time periods in our two datasets (554 and 127), we are confident that Nickell bias need not worry us. However, our models also exhibited varying degrees of first-order serial correlation, even with the lagged dependent variable.¹¹ The adequacy of OLS estimation in these circumstances is difficult to ascertain, however, various simulation studies ([Alvarez and Arellano 2003](#); [Beck and Katz 2004](#); [Keele and Kelly 2006](#)) have indicated that it performs well compared to the leading alternative strategies, even with moderate levels of residual serial correlation.¹² We therefore employed the fixed-effect estimator (OLS), which allowed us to maintain a consistent estimation strategy ensuring comparability across all our models. As a robustness test, we also estimated the same

¹¹We experimented with alternative lag specifications, none of which removed the residual serial correlation.

¹²Estimates for the serial correlation coefficient in our models obtained by Lagrange multiplier tests show that they were around or just above the levels tested by [Keele and Kelly \(2006\)](#).

models using (i) the Prais–Winsten transformation, which takes care of first-order serial correlation and produces a maximum likelihood estimate of the coefficients, and (ii) generalized least squares allowing for panel-specific autocorrelation with heteroskedastic and cross-sectional correlation (Hamilton 1994; Wooldridge 2003; Beck and Katz 2011). The coefficients remained very similar across these three different estimation strategies.

Another concern was that a lagged dependent variable can ‘suppress the explanatory power’ of other variables (Achen 2000). By de-trending the data using borough-specific time trends, we hoped to mitigate against this. Moreover, none of the coefficients for the lagged dependent variable reached the levels that are normally thought to be worrying. We also addressed heteroskedasticity and clustering of errors within boroughs by using cluster-robust standard errors. All analysis was performed using Stata 13.

Multiple comparisons

Because we tested for so many associations, there is a chance that some of the statistically significant results reported came about by chance. The classic response is to control the familywise error rate using the Bonferroni correction. This approach is highly conservative (Gelman *et al.* 2012) and would mean rejecting the results for total crime at monthly and weekly levels, and the associations between drug offences and total searches and between burglary and total searches at the weekly level (the other results remain significant). A less conservative method is to control for the false discovery rate (the proportion of significant results that are false positives). Using the Benjamini–Hochberg procedure and setting the false discovery rate to 0.05 (Benjamini and Hochberg 1995), all of our results remained significant except the association between burglary and total searches at the weekly level.